Summary Judgement Practice in Intellectual Property Cases Part One: Copyright by Katz, Arthur Stanley
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1981
Summary Judgement Practice in Intellectual
Property Cases Part One: Copyright
Arthur Stanley Katz
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arthur Stanley Katz, Summary Judgement Practice in Intellectual Property Cases Part One: Copyright, 1 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 7 (1981).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol1/iss1/4
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
PART ONE: COPYRIGHT
By
Arthur Stanley Katz*
The beginning of wisdom is: Get wisdom;
But with all thy getting, get understanding
Proverbs 4:7
I. INTRODUCTION
This article treats of temptation, of time and money lost, of time
and money saved, of trials avoided and trials delayed, of remedies and
of rights-and, most importantly of all, of equal justice under law. In
short, this article deals with the use and misuse of the motion for sum-
mary judgment in copyright, patent, trademark and related unfair com-
petition matters.**
These matters, often jointly subsumed under the rubric of "intel-
lectual property", and so denominated here, encompass perhaps, the
most evanescent and metaphysical areas of the law. I Their underlying
substantive principles are often esoteric, if not sui generis, when com-
pared with those in other fields of civil law. Intellectual property cases
are, nevertheless, generally litigated (whether in federal or state courts)
under the same rules of practice and procedure which govern all other
classes of civil cases. Accordingly, an understanding of the use and
misuse of the motion for summary judgment in intellectual property
© 1981 Arthur Stanley Katz.
* J.D. New York University School of Law (1950). Member New York Bar (1950).
California Bar (1952). International law practice. Member, Los Angeles Copyright Society.
Author of numerous articles on intellectual property and constitutional law.
** This article will appear in two parts. Part One, which is here published, concerns
itself with the general principles of summary judgment law and their application to copy-
right cases. Part Two, to be published in a later issue of this Journal, will apply these gen-
eral summary judgment principles to patent, trademark and unfair competition cases.
1. "Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to
forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinc-
tions are, or at the least may be, very subtile and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanes-
cent." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344, Fed. Case 4901, 2 Story 100 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841).
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cases can best be accomplished by first examining the generalprincples
controlling the granting or denial of summary judgment.
II. GENEkAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used for
the purpose of obtaining a speedy disposition of a civil case by showing
there are no niaterial issues of fact to be tried, so that, as a matter of
law, the cofhplaint or the defense is without merit. 2 So much for a
succinct statehtent of the black letter law. The translation of this sim-
ple prindiple into practice is not without its perils, as the discussion
below will dehnonstrate. Two statutes will be referred to in this article
to illustrate the workings of a motion for summary judgment, namely,
Rule 56 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 56"), and
§ 437c Californfh Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "§ 437c"). 3
Eaci is closely akih to the other,4 and each is substantially similar to
2. See, e.g., Sartor v, Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944); Pfizer, Inc.
v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040
(1976); Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439, 441-442, 116 P.2d 62, 64 (1941); Richard v. Credit
Suisse, 242 N.Y. 346, 350, 152 N.E. 110, 111 (1926).
The statement set forth in the text refers to a "total summary judgment." Where the
motion does not dispose of the entire case, but does establish that certain "material facts
exist without substantial controversy. as in FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) or that certain "issues
are without substantial controversy . . ." as in the CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 437c (West
1981) (see notb infra), or where "summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages," as in Rule 56(c), then such a disposition is referred to as "partial summary judg-
ment."
3. The text of Rule 56 is set forth in Appendix A, with that of § 437c set forth in Ap-
pendix B.
4. Rule 56(c) provides for a summary judgment where there is a showing "that there is
no genuine issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." FED. R, Civ. P. 56(c). Section 437c provides for a summary judgment
where there is a showing "that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 437c
(West 1981). It is questioned whether there is anypractical difference between a "genuine
issue" and a "triabld issue." An issue which is non-genuine, is, of necessity, non-relevant,
and hence, inadmissible, and thus, non-triable. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 401, 402. See also
FED. R. EvID. 403. These Rules are hereinafter referred to as "Rule - FRE".
There are, however, two areas in which § 437c and Rule 56 are dissimilar in matters of
procedure.
Rule 56(a) states that the claimant party may "move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment .. " Rule 56(b) states that the defending party may "move with
or without suppoiting affdavits for a summary judgment .. " Rule 56(c) states that "Ithe
adverse party . . . may serve opposing affidavits .. " Contrarily, § 437c declares that the
motion shall be supported vo' opposedby affidavits (and other forms of evidentiary materials].
Coyne v. Krempleg, 36 Cal.2d 257, 262-263, 223 P.2d 17, 20 (1950) indicates that the allega-
tions or denials ifi a verified pleading, unsupported by an affidavit, are insufficient to with-
stand a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits. This is the same principle
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summary judgment statutes in other United States jurisdictions, as well
as in Canada and England.5
The temptation to use a motion for summary judgment to dispose
of a case speedily has an obvious attraction to lawyer, litigant and
judge-particularly where the case is complicated, the estimated time
long, the costs heavy, and the court's calendar crowded. This tempta-
tion is not a recent phenomenon. Its existence was duly noted some
two decades ago by a California District Court of Appeal:
In these days of congestion of the courts, the granting of
summary judgments, although a drastic procedure, should be
encouraged, for, in a meritless action, such procedure saves
the court and counsel a great deal of time and unnecessary
work. .... '
This view, in common with all forms of temptation, has a certain
facial appeal; after all, no less a judicial scholar than Judge Cardozo of
found in Rule 56(e). However, the law in California does not appear to have squarely an-
swered the question whether a motion for summary judgment may be successfully argued or
defended against in California where no affidavits are filed and, instead, only admissions.
deposition testimony, or answers to interrogatories are used in the summary judgment pro-
ceedings.
Rule 56(e) requires that: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on per-
sonal knowledge. shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." This
means, of course, that only relevant evidence (see Rule 401 FRE) can be used to support or
oppose a motion, and that the affiant or declarant must be qualified as a witness with per-
sonal knowledge. FED. R. EvID. 602. Rule 56(c) permits the motion to be made or opposed
by "the pleadings. depositions. answers to interrogatories. and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits. fani'..." (Incidentally. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. (1976), the fed-
eral courts, in common with the courts of California. now accept declarations under penalty
of perjury in lieu of affidavits).
Effective January 1. 1981 the second paragraph of § 437c was amended to read as fol-
lows: "The motion shall be supported or opposed by affidavits, declarations, admissions.
answers to interrogatories. depositions and matters of which judicial notice shall or may be
taken. Eridentiar;' objections, not raised here in nfting or oralr at the hearing, shall be
deemed waived." (new matter is in italics). The third paragraph was amended by deleting
the words "admissible" before the word "evidence" in determining what would be consid-
ered in ruling on the motion, and by adding "except that [evidence] to which objections have
been made and sustained by the court . . ." (See Appendix B for the full text). It is ques-
tioned whether these amendments will make it easier to support or oppose a motion for
summary judgment in California. in that the fourth paragraph of § 437c remains unchanged.
That paragraph mirrors the requirements of Rule 56(e) that supporting and opposing affida-
vits or declarations shall set forth admissible evidence.
5. See. e.g.. New York: N.Y. CtV. PRAC. LAW § 3212 (Consol.): Canada: 18 C.E.D.
Judgments § 94 (Ont.3d 1977)- England: 17 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND (4TH ED.)
§§ 309. 314.
6. Martens v. Winder, 191 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149. 12 Cal. Rptr. 413. 416 (1961).
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the NeWy York Court of Appeals (later a Justice of the United States
9up exn Court) had noted in Richard v. Credit Suisse:
The very object of a motion for summary judgment is to
separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment
from what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter
may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial.7
Clearly, a motion for summary judgment is an attractive procedural
devide, in one fell swipe of the judicial axe a case is lopped, in whole
or in pirt, from a crowded docket. A space is cleared in the thicket of
litigation, a glint of sunlight flashes through the cloistered confines of
the court, and the hearts of jurist, clerk, bailiff, and successful litigant
arid lawyer are gladdened.
this salutary result presupposes that the motion was properly
used, that the action summarily disposed of, was, indeed, without
merit, that pleadings fair in form were false in fact, that issues real were
really issues feigned.
But what of the case where the substantive issues are many, where
doubts as to the facts are grave, and where the trial court fails to heed
the teachings of the United States Supreme Court in Associated Press v.
Udited States,' to use caution in invoking Rule 56? The motion is mis-
used. The judgment is appealed. The decision is reversed. The case
remanded and often retried. The end result is to clog still further, to
the detriment of all concerned, the crammed channels of justice. This
same caution would apply equally to California's § 437c and the sum-
mary judgment statutes of other jurisdictions as a policy statement of
the United States Supreme Court.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pinpointed the problems aris-
ing from the misuse of the motion for summary judgment when, in Cox
v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co. ,I it quoted with approval the state-
ment bf Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit, who, in admonish-
ihig i trial judge, declared:
We take this occasion to suggest that trial judges should
exercise great care in granting motions for summary judg-
ment. A litigant has a right to a trial where there is the slight-
est doubt as to the facts, and a denial of that right is
reViewable; but refusal to grant a summary judgment is not
Feviewable. Such a judgment, wisely used, is a praiseworthy
7. 242 N.Y. 346, 350, 152 N.E. 110 (1926).
8. 326 U.S. 1, 6 (1944).
9. 249 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1957).
[Vol. I
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time-saving device. But, although prompt dispatch of judicial
business is a virtue, it is neither the sole nor the primary pur-
pose for which courts have been established. Denial of a ttial
on disputed facts is worse than delay. [Citing authority]
* * * The district courts would do well to note that time has
often been lost by reversals of summary judgments imprpp,
erly entered. [Citing authority].' 0
When, then, should a summary judgment be entered? The United
States Supreme Court has set down the controlling principles in Poller
v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc. :
Summary judgment should be entered only when the
pleadings, affidavits, and admissions filed in the case "show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(c), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. This rule authorizes sum-
mary judgment "only where the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear what the
truth is, . . . [and where] no genuine issue remains for tri4l
• ..[for] the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off frorp
their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try."
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. 321 U.S. 620, 627, 8& L.
Ed. 967, 64 S. Ct. 724 (1944). (emphasis supplied) I
The Supreme Court was speaking of a "total summary judgment" in
Poller. However, the same principles apply to a "partial summary
judgment."' 2
In applying these principles the Ninth Circuit has enunciated per-
tain controlling criteria for determining the propriety of a summary
judgment, to wit:
To obtain a summary judgment, the movant must
demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact,
10. For three recent Ninth Circuit examples of time (and money) lost by revgr~als of
summary judgments improperly entered, see May v. Morganelli-Heumann & A~soc., 618
F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980); Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180 (91h Pir,
1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1976); Saxony Products, Inc. v. Guerlain, Ing., 513 F.2d
716 (9th Cir. 1975).
11. 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962).
12. See note 2 supra. See also, Harms, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., Il Q F, Supp. 484
(S.D. Cal. 1958); Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enterprises, Inc. of California, 160 F. §9pp. 77
(S.D. Cal. 1958); Herman Frankel.Organization v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051 fE.D. Miph.
1973). In these cases an interlocutory summary judgment was rendered, pursd4nt to Rule
56(c), in favor of the claimant on the issue of liability, leaving only the issue of he amount
of damages for trial.
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and the evidence submitted to the court 'must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the opposing party.' (Citing au-
thority). Movant must show "his right to a judgment with
such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and that the
other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible
circumstances." (Citing authority). In determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must give the
nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable factual infer-
ences, (Citing authority) and must do so without assessing
credibility. (Citing authority). Summary judgment is to be
used not as a substitute for trial, but only when "it is quite
clear what the truth is [and) that no genuine issue remains for
trial." (Citing authority)."'
When confronted with a motion for summary judgment,
the trial judge must determine if there are any material fac-
tual issues that should be resolved before the trier of the fact.
It is not the trial judge's function, under Rule 56, to resolve
those issues or to weigh the evidence .... 11
[Tihe presence of a single genuine issue as to a material
fact precludes disposition of a case by summary judgment.'I
Summary judgment is notoriously inappropriate for de-
termination of claims in which issues of intent, good faith and
16other subjective feelings play dominant roles ... .
It is clear then, that the function of a motion for summary judg-
ment under Rule 56 is issue finding and not issue determination. It is
equally clear that this is the same function under § 437c and similar
statutes in other states, as the Supreme Court of California has noted in
Walsh v. Walsh:
[I]n passing upon a motion for summary judgment, the
primary duty of the trial court is to decide whether there is an
issue of fact to be tried. If it finds one, it is then powerless to
proceed further, but must allow such issue to be tried by a
13. Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1976).
14. Cox v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 249 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1957).
15. Cee-Bee Chemical Co., Inc. v. Delco Chemicals, Inc., 263 F.2d 150, 153 (9th Cir.
1959).
16. Pfizer. Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 185 (9th Cir. 1976). cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1976) (citing White Motor Co. v. United States. 372 U.S. 253, 259
(1963)); See also Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Kresge Foundation, 388 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir.
1968) cert. denied, 391 U.S. 934 (1968); 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 56.17 [41.-I] (2d ed.
1980).
Vol. I
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jury unless a jury trial is waived. By an unbroken line of deci-
sion in this state since the date of the original enactment of
section 437c, the principle has become well established that
issue finding rather than issue determination is the pivpt ppon
which the summary judgment law turns. . . . [citing author-
ity]17
Ill. THE USE AND MISUSE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDPRES
A. In a Motion for Summary Judgment Issue Fq7diqg a4d Nat Issue
Determination is the thole Story
Everything else is prologue, epilogue and footnotes, It follows,
therefore, that it is the trial court's role on a motion for summAry judg-
ment solely to ascertain whether there is a genuine issue, or if you will,
a triable issue as to any material fact. If the trial court so finds it must
deny the motion. The court's role has then been fully performed. Tpie
case will now proceed to trial in the customary manner-and yet an-
other piece of litigation will be added to the turgid stream of pen4ing
trials.
Perched just above flood stage the harried tria.1 court dourly con-
templates the deluge of trials awaiting its decision. All too often this
sorry scene causes a trial court to succumb to the temptation tp pad its
part. The motion for summary judgment, that wonderful devipe for the
speedy disposition of cases, is seized upon to remove 4t lea~t one bit of
legal flotsam bobbing before the red-rimmed eyes of the gourt. The
trial court not only finds the genuine/triable issue of rpiterial fact-it
also proceeds to resolve the issue by weighing the evidence. In short,
the court tries the issue, and turns the summary judgment notion into p
substitute for a full blown trial on the merits. This, of course, is revers-
ible error' 8 -whether the trial denied was one to be heard by the coprt,
or tried to a jury.
Now it must be emphasized that the trial covrt, in d.termining
whether there is an issue of material fact to be tried, is not precluded
17. 18 Cal.2d 439, 441-42. 16 P.2d 62, 64 (1941).
18. See cases at note lOsupra. Seealso Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144. 157-
159 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962); Lane Bryant v, Maternity
Lane, Ltd. of California, 173 F.2d 559, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1949); Fitzsimmons v. Best, 528 F.2d
692. 694 (7th Cir. 1976); Conrad v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 1974);
Winters v. Highland Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1978); Walsh v, Walsh, 18 gCal.2d
439, 441-42, 116 P.2d 62, 64 (1941); Martens v. Winder, 191 Cal. App. 20 143, 150, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 413, 417 (1961). Each case illustrates how the trial court overstepped the line from
issue finding to issue determination.
1981]
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from making findings on the evidence. But these findings must be
restricted solely to a determination whether there is a genuine/triable
issue as to any material fact. If the admissible evidence clearly shows
that there .is no genuine/triable issue as to any material fact, then the
moving party (and any non-moving party who is a beneficiary of such
motion) is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law. 9
If, contrarily, the evidence demonstrates that there is even one ma-
terial factual issue in conflict, then it is not the trial court's function on
a motion for summary judgment to resolve such an issue or to weigh
the evidence. 20 Once such a factual conflict is found the trial court
must deny the motion.2 Succinctly stated: unless the admissible evi-
dence absolves all the material issues of fact as a matter of law, no
summary judgment can be granted.22
B. Illustrations
1. General Hypothetical Case
Several examples should suffice to illustrate the problems which
might arise in absolving material fact issues as a matter of law. A case
not timely filed is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. This
is a matter of law, pure and simple. Pure and simple? Well, pure per-
haps, but not always simple. Assume a jurisdiction where the statute of
limitations for the breach of a written contract is four years and that the
plaintiff pleads a breach occurring six years before the action is filed.
This would appear to be a classic case for granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment. And it often is. Absent any conflict as to the material
facts the party raising the statute of limitations is entitled to a summary
judgment as a matter of law.
Now the facts are altered. In opposing the motion for summary
judgment, suppose that plaintiff admits there is no dispute on the appli-
cability of the statute in question, on the time the breach took place,
and when the case was filed. However, plaintiff alleges in a declaration
that defendant is estopped to assert the bar of the statute of limita-
tions23 in that three years before the case was filed the defendant told
19. Sartor v. Arkansas National Gas Co., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944).
20. See cases at notes 14-15 supra.
21. See, e.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal.2d 439, 441, 116 P.2d 62; 64 (1941).
22. Lane Bryant v. Maternity Lane, Ltd. of California, 173 F.2d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 1949).
See also notes 40-42 infra.
23. See Carruth v. Fritch, 36 Cal.2d 426, 224 P.2d 702 (1950). The California Supreme
Court cites numerous decisions from other states demonstrating those situations in which a
defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to a suit not filed
within the period of limitations.
[Vol. I
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plaintiff, "Look, I'm broke now. I know I breached the agreement-
but if you wait three years I'll pay you 100 cents on the dollar. Trust
me." Plaintiff further alleges in his declaration that in reliance upon
this promise plaintiff waited the three years and sued only after defend-
ant refused to pay upon demand.
Defendant admits, in a counter declaration, to the conversation,
but states the parties talked only of the weather. Both parties file third
party declarations backing up their respective positions. The trial court
is inclined to believe defendant; indeed, he thinks plaintiffs position is
incredible. What is the court to do? It can do only one thing correctly,
and that is to deny the motion.
The genuine/triable issue of material fact is whether defendant
had made the promise which plaintiff said he relied upon in delaying
the filing of suit. Conflicting declarations, each containing admissible
evidence, have been filed. As previously noted, the trial court is re-
stricted to finding issues of fact; it cannot determine these issues.24 As
taught by the Ninth Circuit in Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier
Corp. 25: "In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact ex-
ists, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reason-
able factual inferences [citing authority] and must do so without
assessing credibility [citing authority]."
2. Use of Inferences
Rule 56 does not speak of inferences. However, judge-made law,
as demonstrated by the Pfizer case, has engrafted inferences, and their
treatment, onto the federal statute. Section 437c refers specifically to
inferences and permits all inferences reasonably deducible from the ev-
idence, to be considered in support of a motion for summary judgment,
except that "summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based
on inferences reasonably deducible from such evidence, if contradicted
by other inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to any
material fact."2 6 It would appear that the use of inferences in summary
The basic principle upon which these cases rest is succinctly stated in Howard
v. West Jersey & Southern Railroad Co., 102 N.J. Eq. 517 [141 A. 7551, as follows:
"One cannot justly or equitably lull his adversary into a false sense of security, and
thereby cause his adversary to subject his claim to the bar of the statute of limita-
tions, and then be permitted to plead the very delay caused by his course of con-
duct as a defense to the action when brought."
Id. at 433, 224 P.2d at 706.
24. See note 14 supra, and text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
25. 538 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1976),cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1976). See also note 13
mupra .
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c, infra, Appendix B.
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judgment motions is identical under federal and California practice
notwithstanding that the former was created by judicial fiat and the
latter by legislative action.
Before leaving the matter of inferences it is important to note that:
A summary judgment may be improper even though the
basic facts are undisputed if the parties disagree regarding the
material factual inferences that properly may be drawn from
these facts.
2 7
The application of this principle can be seen from the following fact-
pattern: An architect is retained to design a structure. After the design
development drawings are delivered to the client, but before the archi-
tect is fully paid for his services or given the opportunity to make the
working drawings, he is discharged by the client. The drawings bear
the architect's copyright notice. The contract between the architect and
his client states that the drawings are to be returned to the architect at
his request at the completion of the work. The architect makes no such
request when discharged. Subsequently, the client employs another ar-
chitect who uses the drawings of the discharged architect in building
the client's structure. The discharged architect learns of this fact and
sues the former client and other architect for copyright infringement.
As their defense the defendants allege that the ownership in the
discharged architect's drawings was vested in the former client.28 They
raise as an inference in their favor the fact that the discharged architect
had not requested the return of his drawings after he was discharged-
the inference being that the plaintiff did not do so because he recog-
nized he had no ownership rights in the drawings.
Defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that the
former client owned the drawings as a matter of law. In his opposing
affidavit plaintiff makes clear that he was lulled into doing nothing
about seeking the return of his drawings because he had no fear that his
former client would use them since the client, at the time he discharged
plaintiff, wrote plaintiff that the drawings were essentially non-usable
and that he (the former client) would now have to start from scratch in
27. Winters ;,. Highlands Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Lighting
Fixture and Electric Supply Company v. Continental Insurance Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th
Cir. 1969)).
28. On the nice question of ownership of drawings made by an architect for a client see
May v. Morganeii-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1980). A,S. Katz,
Copyright Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings and Designs, 19 L. AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 225 (1954).
[ ol. I
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designing his structure. In short, plaintiff inferred that his former client
would never use plaintiffs drawings, hence he did not seek their return.
The basic facts are undisputed: plaintiff never requested the de-
fendant client to return the drawings after plaintiff was terminated-
and the letter from the client roundly denigrated the plaintiff's work.
But because the parties disagreed regarding the material factual infer-
ences that might properly be drawn from the undisputed facts, the mo-
tion for summary judgment cannot be granted.
In sum, the office of a motion for summary judgment is issue find-
ing and not issue determination,29 so that unless the admissible evi-
dence absolves all the material issues of fact as a matter of law, no
summary judgment can be granted. 0
3. Use of Oral Testimony
As noted earlier,3' a motion for summary judgment is a procedural
device for the speedy disposition of a civil case by showing that as a
matter of law there are no material fact issues to be tried. Because the
motion is intended to be, as its name indicates, a summary proceeding
in lawful avoidance of a full-blown trial, replete with its parade of wit-
nesses giving oral testimony in response to lengthy, if not lively, direct
examination and cross-examination, the motion is generally restricted
to non-oral evidence, inclusive of the pleadings, depositions, admis-
sions on file, answers to interrogatories, affidavits/declarations, and
matters of which the court shall or may take judicial notice.32 The
court may also use stipulations33 and presumptions.
34
29. See discussion and cases at text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
30. See discussion and cases at text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
31. See note 2 supra.
32. See Rule 56(c) and second paragraph § 437c. See also 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 156.11. et seq. and specifically regarding judicial notice, see 156.11(91 (2d ed. 1980).
33. Further. a summary judgment can be based upon the stipulation of the parties, pro-
vided the stipulation using admissible evidence, establishes, as a matter of law. that there are
no genuine issues of material fact. Compare Demella v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
219 F.2d 619 (ist Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 824 (1955); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
California Shipbuilding Corp.. 71 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Blum v. Schuyler Packing
Co., 508 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1974).
34. There are two classes of presumptions: conclusive and procedural. Neither is "evi-
dence". In fact, the conclusive presumption is really a rule of substantive law couched in
procedural form. It is not rebuttable. The procedural presumption is rebuttable. Conclu-
sive and procedural presumptions can be used in motions for summary judgment to the
same extent that they can be used at a formal trial.
Rule 301 of the FEDERAL RULES OF EvIDENCE treats of procedure, i.e.. rebuttable pre-
sumptions. It is substantially equivalent to §§ 600-06, and 630-45 of the CALIFORNIA Evt-
DENCE CODE. See I WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE at 301-1-301-18 (1980).
Rule 302 of the FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDE NCE treats of conclusive presumptions, i.e.,
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Neither Rule 56(c) nor § 437c speaks of the use of oral testimony
at a summary judgment hearing. California restricts the motion to the
"papers submitted" (as noted in the third paragraph of § 437c). Rule
43(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the use of oral
testimony at summary judgment hearings. Accordingly, in federal
practice the use of oral or non-oral testimony at such a hearing is whol-
ly discretionary with the trial court."
As Professor Moore has noted, the use of oral testimony at a sum-
mary judgment hearing can be both beneficial and burdensome:
A few observations about the use of oral testimony may
be useful. Since the witness is subject to cross-examination
and his demeanor is observable by the court, oral testimony
has certain advantages over affidavits and depositions. On
the other hand, receiving evidence at the hearing, as distin-
guished from supporting affidavits or depositions normally re-
quired to be filed at least 10 days before, may not give the
other party a fair opportunity to rebut; and this is particularly
important in the case of the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment.
Also the summary judgment procedure is apt to be
wasteful and burdensome if the summary judgment hearing is
a protracted hearing, in effect a trial, to determine that a trial
those in which the rule of decision is determined by state law. Under the law of California,
for example, "estoppel by contract" per § 622 CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE, and "estoppel
by statement or conduct" per § 623 CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE, are substantive principles
of law which create conclusive presumptions. With reference to the former, see Estate of
Watkins, 16 Cal.2d 793, 108 P.2d 417 (1940) and Estate of Wilson, 64 Cal. App. 3d 786, 134
Cal. RpIr. 749 (1976); with reference to the latter, see Ham v. Grapeland Irrigation Dist., 172
Cal. 611, 158 P. 207 (1916). See also, I WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE J302[0l]-302[03].
The application of Rule 302 FRE is important in a summary judgment proceeding
where the federal court has jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship, or where the
claim or issue has its origin in state law, regardless of the basis of federal jurisdiction. See in
this regard, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Cities Service Oil Co. v.
Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959). Thus, a
federal court, in compliance with Rule 302 FRE would apply § 622 or § 623 to a diversity
case concerning a non-federal contract issue where the contract was made in California, or
performed (or breached) there, or where the contract itself stated that the law of California
was to be applied in the case of a dispute, and, also where the federal court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction under a federal statute, such as the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 101, el
seq. 1976) and where the suit is for infringement of copyright but the defense is based upon
the interpretation of a contract.
35. Compare the following cases: McGuire v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 399
F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1968); Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax Consolidated, 170 F.2d 569 (9th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 924 (1949); Chan Wing Cheung v. Hamilton, 298 F.2d 459
(lst Cir. 1962).
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must be held ... 36 [citations omitted)
Whether permitted or not, it is submitted that it is better practice not to
use oral testimony at a summary judgment hearing. To hold otherwise
is to allow a highly disciplined summary proceeding to turn into a
mini-trial, replete with all the opportunities for the court to commit
reversible error by the denial of procedural due process or by the im-
proper admission or exclusion of evidence."
Indeed, it is precisely because a motion for summary judgment is a
summary proceeding-with the determination of whether there are any
genuine/triable issues as to any material facts generally restricted to
written forms of evidence-that the motion is made vulnerable to mis-
use. As will be seen from the discussion which follows, the vulnerabil-
ity arises when the trial court fails to weight properly the
trustworthiness of the various types of written evidence proffered, and
when it violates the rules of evidence either by the admission of inad-
missible evidence, or by the exclusion of admissible evidence.
Of all the forms of testimony available at the hearing of a motion
for summary judgment the most trustworthy would, of course, be oral
testimony. The deponent would be present in the courtroom, his de-
meanor in testifying would be observable by the court and he would,
most importantly of all, be subject to cross-examination by opposing
counsel and to inquiry by the court. A consummate cross-examiner, in
concert with an alert court, can wrest the truth, more often than not,
from even the most practiced purveyor of perjury. But should oral tes-
timony not be permitted at a hearing for summary judgment motion-
and as noted above, this is generally the case, either by practice or stat-
ute-which of the forms of written testimony are the most trustworthy?
4. Use of Written Testimony
Clearly, admissions are the most probative. If a party admits a
material fact, either in a request for admissions, or in an admissible
exchange of correspondence which preceded the litigation, or in an an-
swer to an interrogatory, or in a deposition, taken in accordance with
the applicable rules of procedure, such admissions establish that there
can be no genuine/triable issue as to that material fact.
Affidavits/declarations are the least trustworthy of all the forms of
written testimony used in summary judgment proceedings. They lack
36. 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 156.11 [8] (2d ed. 1980).
37. See Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975) and Chan
Wing Cheung v. Hamilton, 298 F.2d 459 (Ist Cir. 1962).
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the spontaneity of response engendered by live confrontation and the
cross-examination of opposing counsel. Human nature being what it is,
the spontaneous response is more likely to reveal the truth than the
considered, carefully structured statement often found in affidavits
(and in guarded or ambiguous answers to interrogatories).
Despite its unilateral nature an affidavit can be extremely trust-
worthy if it is carefully confined to a recital of clear-cut material facts
which are supported by admissible evidence, to wit:
1. Pursuant to Article I of the contract of X date (a
photocopy of which is attached, marked "Exhibit I," and in-
corporated by reference), plaintiff was required to pay de-
fendant Y dollars, on or before Z date.
2. Affiant signed the contract upon plaintiff's behalf, in
his capacity as Chief Executive Officer, and declares that the
attached photocopy is a true copy of the original contract.
3. Plaintiff paid Y dollars to defendant prior to Z date,
as evidenced by the attached photocopy of the cancelled
check showing deposit and clearance of said check prior to Z
date. (A photocopy of the cancelled check, marked "Exhibit
2" and incorporated by reference, is here attached.)
4. Affiant caused the cancelled check to be drawn on
plaintiff's bank account, and declares that the attached photo-
copy is a true copy of the original cancelled check.
5. Pursuant to Article 2 of the contract, defendant
agreed to deliver Q amounts of R items to the plaintiff within
S days of clearance of plaintiff's check.
6. More than S days have passed since plaintiff's check
cleared and defendant has failed to deliver any of the items it
agreed to deliver.
Such an affidavit would be highly probative since it contains wholly
admissible evidence, is totally devoid of argument, and includes facts
showing that the affiant made the affidavit on personal knowledge and
that he was competent to testify to the matters stated therein.38
Deposition testimony is more trustworthy than that derived from
affidavits/declarations in that the deponent has ostensibly been subject
to cross-examination by counsel for all opposing parties. A deposition
is trustworthy, ie., probative, against a party only if it is admissible in
38. See Rule 56(e) and 437c (fourth paragraph). Paragraphs I and 5 of this affidavit are
the beneficiaries of the conclusive presumption of estoppel by contract, see discussion in
note 34 supra.
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evidence against such a party. Thus, in a multi-party case the circum-
stances under which the deposition was taken may make it admissible
in evidence against certain of the parties, and inadmissible against
others. This important point is fully discussed below.
5. Use of Hearsay
Rule 801(c) FRE defines "Hearsay" as "a statement, 39 other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, of-
fered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Rule 802
FRE makes hearsay inadmissible except as provided by the Rules of
Evidence or by other rules of the Supreme Court. Section 1200(a) of
the California Evidence Code declares that "'Hearsay evidence' is evi-
dence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testi-
fying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated." Section 1200(b) makes hearsay evidence inadmissible, except
as provided by law.
Affidavits/Declarations and depositions are used in a summary
judgment proceeding to prove the truth of the matter stated. They are,
or course, hearsay. However, the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule
802 FRE names such affidavits/declarations and depositions as excep-
tions to the Hearsay Rule. In California such materials are also excep-
tions to the Hearsay Rule. But here, again, the opportunity arises for
misuse of the motion for summary judgment. A court commits revers-
ible error when it fails to recognize that the hearsay exception applies
solely to the affidavits/declarations and depositions as documents. The
statements in these documents must be admissible in evidence in order
to be used in supporting or opposing a motion for summary judg-
ment.4 o
Admissions by a party, either in his individual or representative
capacity, adoptive and authorized admissions, the admissions of a co-
conspirator, declarations against interest, inconsistent statements, prior
consistent statements, and past recollection recorded, are all examples
of exceptions to the Hearsay Rule in both federal and California civil
practice in accordance with the principles laid down in the respective
evidence statutes.41
39. Rule 801(a) FRE states: "A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion."
40. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 n.19 (1970); Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers
Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1980).
41. See Rules 801(d)(1)(2), 802, 803 and 804 FRE and Advisory Committee Notes with
respect thereto, and §§ 1220-1227, 1230-1237 CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE and Legislative
Analysis with respect thereto.
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It cannot be overemphasized that a court may not properly grant a
summary judgment, or, indeed, deny one, on the basis of hearsay or
other inadmissible evidence.42 Thus, it is not sufficient that a particular
piece of proffered evidence falls within an exception to the Hearsay
Rule. The proffered evidence must itself not be inadmissible hearsay or
other inadmissible evidence." Several examples are posed to illustrate
the operation of this vital principle, and the reversible error which re-
sults from its misuse.
Assume the following hypothetical case: An Air Force pilot bails
out of his disabled craft. He lands unhurt in the ocean. An Air Force
helicopter is sent to rescue him. The helicopter lowers a safety line.
The pilot hooks onto the line, and when he is approximately 50 feet in
the air the line parts and pilot and line fall into the sea. The fall se-
verely injures the pilot. He sues the Air Force, the manufacturer of the
line, and the manufacturer of the line's locking mechanism. The line
itself is not recovered. The locking mechanism is examined by the Air
Force during its investigation. The mechanism is purportedly photo-
graphed, in its assembled and dissembled forms and then for unknown
reasons, the mechanism is lost.
The plaintiff takes discovery, by deposition, of the Air Force per-
sonnel who examined the mechanism. One deponent examines the
photographs and states he took the photographs. He further states that
he did not personally remove the mechanism from the helicopter, but
was told it was the part involved in the lawsuit. Another Air Force
deponent testifies he was an expert in handling such mechanisms as the
one in question, that he had examined the mechanism which, he under-
stood, was the one involved in the accident. He then identifies the pho-
tographs as being that of the subject mechanism-although he was not
present when the photography was made. He testifies, pointing to one
photograph, that in his opinion the accident resulted from a defective
locking cylinder.
The defendant manufacturer of the locking mechanism did not
manufacture the entire mechanism. In fact, it assembled the mecha-
nism from parts made by its subcontractors. Two of these subcontrac-
tors could have made the locking cylinder which the Air Force
deponent said was defective. Checking its records the defendant manu-
facturer infers from its bookkeeping data that Company X made the
42. See,'e.g., Hamilton v. Keystone Tankship Corporation, 539 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir.
1976); Taylor v. Redari A/S Volvo, 249 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966); 608 Hamilton
Street Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 244 F. Supp. 193, 195 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
43. See cases, statutes and discussion in notes 40-42 supra.
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part. It so advises plaintiff. Plaintiff now sues Company X and the
defendant manufacturer cross-complains against Company X. Coin-
pany X seeks to depose the Air Force personnel who were deposed
before it became a party. This is impossible since the deponents have
been discharged and cannot be located.
The defendant manufacturer files a motion for summary judgment
against Company X. It introduces the photographs and deposition tes-
timony as evidence that there can be no triable issue as a matter of law
of (1) the material facts that Company X made the locking cylinder, (2)
that this cylinder was defective, and (3) that this defect caused the acci-
dent. Plaintiff joins in the motion for summary judgment. The moving
party acknowledges that there is a possibility the depositions might be
hearsay insofar as Company X is concerned. However, it says to the
Court, inasmuch as affidavits can be used in motions for summary
judgments, treat the depositions as affidavits, and admit them into evi-
dence. Company X argues that none of the "evidence" proffered is ad-
missible, that the motion is facially defective, and it files no opposition
affidavits.
The trial court grants the motion. Company X appeals. Should
the summary judgment be reversed? Most assuredly.
A summary judgment cannot be based upon hearsay or other
inadmissible evidence." As such, the summary judgment against
Company X must be reversed since the only "evidence" offered by the
moving party consisted solely of inadmissible hearsay depositions45
44. Taylor v. Redari A/S Volvo, 249 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966); 608 Hamilton
Street Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 244 F. Supp. 193, 195 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
45. The depositions relied upon by the defendant manufacturer cannot be used against
appellant. Company X, as a hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(1) FRE. There is nothing
in the hypothetical record to controvert the fact that appellant was not a party to the litiga-
tion at the time the depositions of the Air Force deponents were taken. As such, appellait
was not present at their depositions and, of necessity. could not cross-examine any of thfti.
Under such circumstances can these hearsay depositions be offered as admissible eviddice
against appellant? The answer is a resounding "No!" The cases and text-writers are wholly
in accord.
Perhaps the best analysis in any one case is found in Brown v. Tanner, 164 So.2d 848
(Fla. App. 1964), 4 A.L.R.3d 1063. The Florida District Court of Appeals is quoted as
follows:
Surprisingly, this subject has not received extensive treatment by the modem
authorities. In our extensive research we have located fragments of statements in
opinions which generally sustain the position that a deposition [10661 taken in the
absence of the opposing party is not admissible in that it violates the hearsay rule.
In his treatise on evidence Professor Wigmore concludes that the deposition
would be excluded where the opposing party has not been afforded the opportunity
of cross-examination and submits that the principle is precisely the same as for
testimony obtained in any other manner and states: 'The mere speaking under
oath is not sufficient; the essential condition is that the person against whom the
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and of unauthenticated, and hence irrelevant, and inadmissible photo-
skorn stitement is offered should have had an opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent.' (court's emphasis).
4 A.L.R. 3d at 1065-66. Justice Jones in his treatise on Evidence, Fifth Edition, states the
rule as follows:
Depositions are not to be rejected for the reason that, subsequent to their tak-
ing, the pleadings have been materially amended, if the issues remain substantially
the same. But if new parties are joined, depositions which have been taken before
their joinder may not be read against such new parties.
Id. 164 So. 2d at 849-50. The court in Brown v. Tanner then cites and quotes a number of
supporting state and federal cases and textbooks. One of the federal cases cited and quoted
is Hoffier v. Wheeler, 179 A.2d 909 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962). The Municipal Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia declared that with reference to the propriety of using a
ddposition against a person newly made a party, where such deposition had been taken
before such person had been made a party:
No case squarely in point has been cited to us and we have found none; but in
our opinion it is unthinkable that a person can be bound by a proceeding in an
action against him when that proceeding occurs before he has been served with
process or has entered an appearance ...
Id. at 910. It is submitted that it is equally unthinkable that the hearsay depositions relied
upon by the defendant manufacturer can be used against Company X in support of the
manufacturer's motion for summary judgment.
Rule 804(b)(1) FRE permits the hearsay deposition testimony of an unavailable witness
to be used against a party only "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered...
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect
examination." FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1).
In 4 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 804(b)(1)[021 (1975), District Judge Weinstein unequivo-
cdlly declares:
If the opportunity to cross-examine was lacking the prior testimony must be
excluded.
In support of this cornerstone principle of Rule 804(b)(1) FRE, District Judge Weinstein
cites and analyzes, inter alia, several recent federal court cases, among them, Matter of Ster-
ling Navigation Co., Ltd., 444 F. Supp. 1043, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); First National Bank In
Greenwich v. National Airlines, 22 F.R.D. 46, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The First National-Bank
case concerned an airplane crash wherein plaintiff had joined National Airlines and Doug-
las Aircraft. In three previous cases depositions had been taken against National when
-Douglas was not a party. Plaintiff now sought to use those depositions against Douglas in
the First National Bank case. The court refused to permit the prior depositions to be used
against Douglas. Approving of the court's decision, District Judge Weinstein, in his treatise,
made the following cogent observations:
Pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1), the deposition could not be used against Douglas not
only becduse it was not a party to the previous proceedings, but because National's
motive in examining witnesses in those proceedings were not the same as Douglas'.
National may have sought to avoid liability by showing that the crash was caused
by strudtdral deficiencies rather than bad weather. Such evidence should not be
usable against Douglas. The danger of prejudice to Douglas if the depositions are
introduced against National remains the same under Rule 804(b)(i) as under prior
lpractice. If the trial judge concludes that this danger outweighs the probative value
of evidence, the depositions should be excluded pursuant to Rule 403. It should be
noted hbwever, that in reaching his determination, the judge in the First National
Bank In Greemisch case assumed that the same witnesses could be deposed in the
present case. Rule 804(b)(1) is based on the premise that the witness is unavailable.
When probative value is weighed against prejudice in such a case, a different bal-
ance may be struck. (emphasis supplied).
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graphic and other secondary documentary evidence. 6
The trial court cannot cure the inadmissible nature of the "evi-
dence" offered by treating the hearsay depositions as affidavits,47 and
4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 804(b)(1)[041 (1975).
See also Hewitt v. Hutter, 432 F.Supp. 795 (W.D. Va. 1977), aft'd, 568 F.2d 773 (4th
Cir. 1978) (California deposition of witness not admissible against plaintiff where plaintiff
was not party to that action and cross-examination of witness at deposition was conducted
by party who is adverse to plaintiff in present litigation); Taylor v. Redari A/S Volvo, 249 F.
Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966); 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE 56.1114 n.6 (2d ed. 1980).
Blum v. Campbell, 355 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Md. 1972); Pikle-Rite Co. v. Bonduel Pickling Co.,
282 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
The same situation prevails in the instant hypothetical case. Clearly, the depositions
upon which the defendant manufacturer relied in its motion for summary judgment cannot
be used against appellant as an hearsay exception under Rule 804(b)(1) FRE.
46. Hamilton v. Keystone Tankship Corporation, 539 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Dibble, 429 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1970); see also, Rules 104,401,402, 901, 1001
and 1008 FRE, and §§ 350, 351,400-06, 1400, 1401 CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE. In Ham-
ilton, the Ninth Circuit noted: "Exhibits which have not had a proper foundation laid to
authenticate them cannot support a motion for summary judgment." 539 F.2d at 686.
47. The trial court cannot transform hearsay depositions into admissible evidence for
use against appellant simply by treating them as affidavits. The court reasoned in the hypo-
thetical case that since depositions are "at least as good as affidavits. .. " (United States v.
Fox, 211 F. Supp. 25, 30 (E.D. Pa. 1962), affd 334 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1964) and since affida-
vits can be used to support a motion for summary judgment, then let's call these hearsay
depositions affidavits and admit them as such. Neat, but wholly erroneous. One can no
more turn a sow's ear into a silk purse, than one can turn an inadmissible deposition into
admissible evidence through the simple expedient of transforming the faulty deposition into
an affidavit.
The point the trial court failed to note was this: that ira deposition is at least as good as
an affidavit, that a bad deposition makes a bad affdavit. In short, changing the nomenclature
does not change the nature of the evidence. Hearsay remains hearsay. Inadmissible evi-
dence remains inadmissible. Nonauthenticated exhibits remain nonauthenticated and,
hence, not relevant. The same situation obtains in the instant hypothetical case.
Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.C.N.J. 1975) is the leading case concerning
turning depositions into affidavits to support a motion for summary judgment. In Tormo the
court permitted depositions taken before a party was joined to be treated as affidavits and
used against such party. In so doing the court made the critical distinction which the trial
court failed to make in the hypothetical instant case. That distinction is: where the deponent
e/a deposition cannot be available as a witness at the trial, then such deposition, if taken before
a party wasjoined, cannot be used against such party to support a motionfor summaryjudg-
ment. In short, such a deposition remains inadmissible hearsay.
The following excerpts from Tormo make this distinction clear:
[Devlin objects] to use of Wendel's and Tormo's deposition testimony on the
present motion. Devlin argues that it may not be considered against him because it
was taken prior to the time he was brought into the case and therefore he was
neither represented at, nor given reasonable notice of, its taking.
Id. at 1168-69. See FED. R. Clv. P. 32(a).
He rests his objection on Taylor v. Redari A/S Volvo, 249 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
The issue in Taylor was whether a third-party defendant was entitled to summary
judgment where the only evidence against him was contained in the deposition of
plaintilf's decedent which had been taken prior to the time he was brought into the
action. The court held that the third-party defendant's motion must be granted
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b~y ednsttuing all factual inferences in favor of the moving party.4"
VFI fiher, "a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is
directed need not file any contravening affidavits or other material but
i etltitled to a denial of the motion for summary judgment where the
fioVantjs papers are insufficient on their face or themselves demon-
t ite the existence of a material issue of fact."49
This hypothetical case illustrates the close interrelationship be-
twddn the law of evidence and the substantive principles upon which a
Itidtioti for summary judgment is bottomed. In the case stated the trial
etbtitt rlisapplied, in an egregiously erroneous manner, the law of evi-
deridei The result was reversible error, and a case remanded for a full
idcd (i) only admissible evidence maybe considered on summary udgment, and (2)
ih'e decedent's deposition, being unable to meet the requirements of Rule 26(d) (now
?2("a)), FedR, Cv.P., would not be admlssibe as evidence against him at the trial.
Rule 32(a), the successor provision to Rule 26(d), requires, inter alia, that in
oiddr ihat deposition testimony may be admissible against any party, that partysnuit have been "present or represe ted
at the taking of the deposition" 
or must
have had "reasonable notice therof" By its terms, the rule applies "at the trial or
uporn the heating of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding ."Despite this
lanhguage, however, courts and commentators have rejected the notion that the rule
geonems the use of deposition testimony at a hearing or a 
proceeding at which evi-
dee in adavitform is admissible. See United States 
v. Fox, 211 F. Supp. 25
ED La. 1962), aIf'd 334 F.2d 449 (th Cir. 1964); Wrght & Miller, FED>ERAL
PACTIlCE & PROCEDURE: CtVIL § 2142 (1970). The reasonjnag behind this rejec-ion is that deposition testimony taken under oath, even if failing 
to satisfy Rule
3i(a)'s requirements, is "at least a goos affidavits." 
United States v. Fox, 211 F.
eupp, at 30.
this proposition is both supported by obvious good 
sense, and. according to
thisCourt's reading, not contradicted by the Taylor opinion. Taylor cannot be
fetid to hold that a deposition must satisfy Rule 32(a) in order to be considered on
a motion for summary judgment, but rather that a deposition, like an affdavit, must
sddtsfy Rule 56(e)'s requirement that it "set/forth such/facts as would be admissible inev PeRce. FED.R.CIv.P. 56(e). The court held tha  
it could not consider the
dceilent's deposition, not because Rule 32(a)'s predecessor barred its use on sum-
ia& judgment, but because that provision would bar its use at trial. In the present
Case Rule32(a) will not bar the admissibility of the facts 
set forth in the depositions
df Wendel and Tormo because those facts will be offered, not in the form of priorldepostion testimony, but in theorm otestimony opresently 
available witnesses. S
bevn's reliance on Taylor is misplaced; the Court will consider 
the question of his
Iiipiity to plaintiffs in light of all available deposition testimony." 
(emphasis sup-
plidd), Id. at 1168.69.
It is patently manifest in our hypothetical case that since 
none of the deponents would
hav u appeared at the trial as witnesses, th their depositions 
are hearsay insofar as appellant
is ctedtooed, Such deposition testimony does not become 
admissible merely because it is
dalld an affidavit. Hearsay depositions cannot be used at a trial. Accordingly, however
named, they cannot be used to support a motion for summary 
judgment. Hamilton v. Key-
-toh6 Tauekship Corporation, 539 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 
1976).
id The cnttary is the law, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 
398 U.S. 144, 157, 158-59
|I9'70),
49? Hamilton v. Keystone Tankship Corporation, 539 
F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1976);
Shlrnan v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 
439 (9th Cir. 1979); Adikes v. S.H.
Ipess & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970).
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trial on the merits-with a considerable loss of time, money and 4;,
fort-suffered by the parties, court and counsel.
The general principles controlling the granting or denial of a m1Qr
tion for summary judgment having been examined, and the use An4
misuse of summary judgment procedures having been reviewed, at;o,
tion is now turned to the application of these principles and procdulrfs
in intellectual property cases.
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN COPYRIGHT CASES
.4. "hen the Case Turns on Contract Issues
The general summary judgment principles enunciated alid e:-
plored in previous portions of this article are wholly applicable to cpp
right cases. Thus, if there is no genuine/triable issue as to any mat.ri 1
fact, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment as a rn~ttqr pf
law.50 Conversely, if such an issue exists, the motion for summary
judgment must be denied."'
Copyright litigation tends to fall into two major areas, one dl1
with infringement questions, the other, with contract issues, S6F-,
times, these two areas are involved in the same case, as where the ipup
of copyright infringement is addressed only after the contractual rights
of the parties in the subject work have been resolved. 2 Accordingly, ii
is profitable to review first the impact of contract issues in the grating
or denial of summary judgments in copyright cases before turning to
the subject of summary judgment where alleged copyright infringemeflt
is the only issue.
Copyright cases sometimes concern themselves with such gener(t
contract issues as those of construction and interpretation,"1 qustom
and usage54 and accord and satisfaction.5 5 They further concern thei.,
selves with such suigeneris contract issues as whether a particular worlk
was a "work for hire."5 Each of these contract issues, whether of I
general or sui generis nature, presents an issue of fact, and if such fact
issue "may affect the outcome of the litigation" it is "[a] material j .
50. Piantadosi v. Loew's Inc., 137 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1943).
51. Goodis v. United Artists Television Inc., 425 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1970),
52. See, e.g., May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 1364-67.
54. Id. at 1367-68.
55. .d. at 1366.
56. Id. at 1368-69.
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sue."
5 7
As illustrated by the recent Ninth Circuit case of May v. Mor-
ganeili-Heumann & Assoc. ,"8 contract issues are generally raised by
parties defending against a claim of copyright infringement. And this
is often sound strategy. If a defendant in a copyright infringement ac-
tion can establish by his motion for summary judgment that he had a
right under contract, or contract principles, to copy and use a substan-
tial portion of the plaintiff's work, then, of course, the trial court never
reaches the issue of copyright infringement. This was the strategy cho-
sen by defendants in the May case. Initially, the strategy worked. The
trial court granted the defendant's motion with alacrity. The case was
disposed of without the issue of copyright infringement being reached.
The trial court's calendar was relieved of.a four week jury trial. And
defendants thought they were home free. However, this was not to be.
The case was reversed on appeal and remanded for trial "because de-
fendants' right to use May's work depends on issues of contract inter-
pretation not properly resolved on summary judgment."59
The May case is an example of the misuse of summary judgment
procedures in a copyright case. The contract related issues, all of them
factual, were so convoluted (even the question of election of remedies
was raised),60 that defendants were unable to establish as a matter of
law that the contract as interpreted and construed by defendants, gave
them the right to copy and use plaintiff's architectural drawings after
plaintiffs services were terminated. The May case should be con-
trasted with that of Piantadosi v. Loews, Inc.6 t
In Piantadosi the Ninth Circuit affirmed, on contractual grounds, a
summary judgment dismissing a copyright infringement suit. The
court held that defendants' affidavits showed they had obtained a li-
cense to use the musical composition in issue, and that plaintiff, by
merely denying the existence of the license, raised no genuine issue of
material fact. Accordingly, the license was found to be proved.
The contractual fact problems were highly convoluted in both the
May and Piantadosi cases. Yet summary judgment was properly de-
nied in the former and affirmed in the latter. Thus, facts as maze-like
as the famed tunnels of ancient Minoa need not preclude the granting
57. Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir.
1977).
58. 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 1364.
60. Id. at 1366-67.
61. 137 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1943).
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or denial of summary judgment in copyright cases on contract pr con-
tract related principles. Successful use of contract doctrines in copy-
right cases will turn less on how complex the facts are, and more on
whether court and counsel understand the uses and misuses of sum-
mary judgment procedures in resolving or raising material issues of
fact.
Before turning to an examination of summary judgment practice
in copyright infringement cases, it is important to note that Rule p6(c)
authorizes an interlocutory summary judgment in favor of the claimant
on the issue of liability, when he is entitled thereto as a matter of law,
although there is a genuine issue of fact as to the amount of damAges.
In such a case, only the issue of the measure of damages remains for
trial.62
B. Where the Case Is One of Alleged Infringement
1. Copying and Improper Appropriation
The best starting point for any discussion of summary judgmenlt
practice in copyright infringement cases is the decision of the Second
Circuit inArnstein v. Porter.63 InArnstein the defendant was the highly
regarded songwriter, Cole Porter. The plaintiff Arnstein was a song-
writer of lesser repute, yet one whose works were widely sold and pub-
licly performed. (At the time he sued Porter plaintiff was already a
"five-time loser" insofar as his trial record as a plaintiff in cqpyright
infringement cases was concerned.) Arnstein contended that his com-
positions had been stolen from his rooms and had ended up as compo-
sitions released as written by Porter. In his deposition Porter denied
any knowledge of any of Arnstein's compositions, and of any person
who might have stolen them. Porter further submitted comparisons of
the music tending to show that they were dissimilar. Arnsteirq suibmit,
ted no counter evidence on the issue of Porter's honesty. Porter'8 mo,
tion for summary judgment was granted.
On appeal, Judge Jerome Frank, writing for the majority, reversed
the summary judgment and laid down the two separate elements which
had to be proven to establish an infringement of copyright:
(a) that defendant copied from plaintiff's copyrighted
62. Harms. Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 163 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Harms, Inc.
v. Tops Music Enterprises, Inc. of California, 160 F. Supp. 77-(S.D. Cal, 1958); Hermani
Frankel Organization v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
63. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
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work and (b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went
so far as to constitute improper appropriation.
As to the first-copying-the evidence may consist (a) of
defendant's admission that he copied or (b) of circumstantial
evidence-usually evidence of access-from which the trier of
the facts may reasonably infer copying. Of course, if there are
no similarities, no amount of evidence of access will suffice to
prove copying. If there is evidence of access and similarities
exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the
similarities are sufficient to prove copying. On this issue,
analysis ('dissection') is relevant, and the testimony of experts
may be received to aid the trier of the facts. If evidence of
access is absent, the similarities must be so striking as to pre-
clude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant indepen-
dently arrived at the same result.
If copying is established, then only does there arise the
second issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful appropriation).
On that issue. . the test is the response of the ordinary lay
hearer; accordingly, on that issue, 'dissection' and expert testi-
mony are irrelevant.
In some cases, the similarities between the plaintiffs and
defendant's work are so extensive and striking as, without
more, both to justify an inference of copying and to prove
improper appropriation. But such double-purpose evidence is
not required; that is, if copying is otherwise shown, proof of
improper appropriation need not consist of similarities which,
standing alone, would support an inference of copying.
Each of these two issues--copying and improper appro-
priation-is an issue of fact. . ...
Judge Frank then applied the general principles of summary judg-
ment to the record before him:
We turn first to the issue of copying. After listening to
the composition as played in the phonograph recording sub-
mitted by defendant, we find similarities; but we hold that un-
questionably, standing alone, they do not compel the
conclusion, or permit the inference, that defendant copied.
The similarities, however, are sufficient so that, if there is
enough evidence of access to permit the case to go to the jury,
64. Id. at 468-69.
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the jury may properly infer that the similarities did not result
from coincidence.
Summary judgment was, then, proper if indubitably de-
fendant did not have access to plaintiff's compositions.
Plainly that presents an issue of fact. On that issue, the dis-
trict judge, who heard no oral testimony, had before him the
depositions of plaintiff and defendant. The judge character-
ized plaintiff's story as 'fantastic'; and .. . the judge obvi-
ously accepted defendant's denial of access and copying.
Although part of plaintiff's testimony on deposition. . . does
seem 'fantastic', yet plaintiff's credibility, even as to those im-
probabilities, should be left to the jury . . We should not
overlook the shrewd proverbial admonitions that sometimes
truth is stranger than fiction.65
Judge Frank then concluded that plaintiff's credibility was itself a gen-
uine issue of material fact that should not be disposed of in a summary
judgment proceeding:
But even if we were to disregard the improbable aspects
of plaintiff's story, there remain parts by no means 'fantastic.'
On the record now before us, more than a million copies of
one of his compositions were sold; copies of others were sold
in smaller quantities or distributed to radio stations or band
leaders or publishers, or the pieces were publicly performed.
If, after hearing both parties testify, the jury disbelieves de-
fendant's denials, it can, from such facts, reasonably infer ac-
cess. It follows that, as credibility is unavoidably involved, a
genuine issue of materialfactpresents itself. With credibility a
vital factor, plaintiff is entitled to a trial where the jury can
observe the witnesses while testifying. Plaintiff must not be
deprived of the invaluable privilege of cross-examining the
defendant-the 'crucial test of credibility'-in the presence of
the jury .... " (emphasis supplied)
As a consequence ofArnstein v. Porter "district courts have treated
motions for summary judgment in plagiarism suits with cau-
tion. . ,,67 And this is to be commended. But caution should not
give way to awe and inaction. Copyright is an evanescent field of law,
65. Id. at 469.
66. Id. at 469-70. See also the discussion of credibility at text accompanying note 25
supra.
67. Millstein v. Leland Hayward, Inc.. 10 F.R.D. 198, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
1981]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOUPATAL
But its principles are not so esoteric that they cannot be mastered for
proper use in seeking or opposing motions for summary judgment.
2. Originality
Neither the 1909 Copyright Act, as amended,68 nor the current
Act,69 define the terms "author" or "writings." However, the United
States Supreme Court has done so succinctly in Goldstein v. Califor-
nia. 70
By Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution, the States granted
to Congress the power to protect the 'Writings' of 'Authors.'
These terms have not been construed in their narrow literal
sense but, rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad
scope of constitutional principles. While an 'author' may be
viewed as an individual who writes an original composition,
the term, in its constitutional sense, has been construed to
mean an 'originator,' 'he to whom anything owes its origin.'
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58, 28
L. Ed. 349, 4 S. Ct. 279 (1884). Similarly, although the word
"writings" might be limited to script or printed material, it
may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of the
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor."
To be copyrightable, i.e., protectible, the work must be original,'2
that is, it must be the result of independent labor and not of copying. 3
However, the work need not be the first of its kind.' Although the
68. 17 USC §§ I etseq. (1976) (originally enacted as the Copyright Act of July 30, 1947,
61 Stat. 652).
69. 17 USC §§ 101 et seq. (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
Before passage the Bill was called S.22. Per Section 102 of Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598,
the Act became effective on January 1, 1978, except as otherwise expressly provided by the
Act, including provisions of the first section of the Act. The provisions of sections 118,
304(b), and chapter 8 of title 17, as amended by the first section of the Act, took effect upon
the Act's enactment on October 19, 1976.
For an analysis of portions of this Act as they concern author's rights, see A.S. Katz,
The 1976 Copyright Revision Act andAuthor's Rights: A Negative Overview, 4 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 171 (1977), and for an analysis of the subject matter and scope of copyright under the
1976 Act, see A.E. Katz, The General Revision of the Copyright Law - From Bare Bones to
Corpulence -A Partial Overview, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 213 (1977).
70. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
71. Id. at 560.
72. "[Ojriginality is alone the test of validity [of a copyright]," Learned Hand, J., in
Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 149-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); DRONE ON COPYRIGHT, 198, 199
(1879). See L. Yankwich, Originali y in the Law of Intellectual Propert, 11 F.R.D. 457
(1951).
73. DRONE ON COPYRIGHT 208 (1879).
74. "No one doubts that two directories, independently made, are each entitled to copy-
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concept of "newness" or novelty is a prerequisite in the law of pat-
ents,7" it has no place in the law of statutory copyright.16 As this writer
has noted previously:
77
To require an author, who has created something origi-
nal, to warrant and prove that it is also novel, that it has never
been done before anywhere at any time, is to confront him
with an obstacle too difficult to overcome. History has re-
corded numerous incidents where two gifted men, working
unaware of the other's efforts, have arrived, almost simultane-
ously, at the same results or discoveries. Yet if absolute nov-
elty must be proven before either could restrain the
unauthorized publication of his work, neither would receive
protection. It should be sufficient that the work of each au-
thor is new to him, that is, that it is original with him, and not
copied from the work of another.78
3. What Is Protectible is Copyrightable
The writings of an author are infringed when a substantialpart of
the protectible material has been copied. What is protectible, i.e., what
is copyrightable, is a mixed question of law and fact, in that the deter-
mination of whether certain subject matter is copyrightable requires the
trial court to make a legal conclusion based upon an analysis of facts.
The existence of mixed questions of law andfact precludes summaryjudg-
right, regardless of their similarity, even though it amount to identity. Each being the result
of original work, the second will be protected, quite regardless of its lack of novelty." Fisher
v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J.).
75. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101. 102 (1952), 66 Stat. 792.
76. "Unlike the subject matter of a patent, material need not be new, but only original."
Clark. C.J., in Ricker v. General Electric Co., 162 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1947): Chamberlin v.
Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945); Fisher v. Dillingham, 198 Fed. 145 (S.D.N.Y.
1924).
77. A.S. Katz, Copiright Protection of /rchitectural Plans, Drawings and Designs, 19 L.
AND CONTENIP. PROB. 224. 231 (1954).
78. Melville B. Nimmer, Esq., in his ground-breaking article, Nimmer, The Law of
Ideas. 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (1954). points up the confusion engendered by many courts by
their misuse of the terms originality and novelty. (Reference must be made to his monu-
mental treatise, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1980, for a full knowledge of this field of law).
Confusion must result as to the true nature of copyright where the courts interject the
element of no relp, as an aid to establishing the originality f a work in those cases where both
the plaintiffs and defendant's works use similar stock incidents and characters. It is submit-
ted that when courts speak of the requirement of "a new conception or novel arrangement"
they mean only that an author's work must be sufficiently different in expression or derelop-
men! as to indicate that it is original and not copied from the protected work of another or
from public domain material to which the plaintiff had access. A case in point is Simonton
v. Gordon, 297 F. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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menit. 9 Accordingly, those cases of copyright infringement are not
suitable for adjudication by summary judgment which turn on such
nice questions as whether the material which defendant is alleged to
have copied is merely historical or geographical fact, or original or in
the public domain, or permitted as a "fair use,"8 or outside the scope
of the Copyright Act. These issues, if in the slightest degree they in-
volve credibility, or complex factual analysis, should be tried only in a
full dress trial. They do not fairly lend themselves to disposition in the
speedy manner contemplated by the summary judgment statutes.8'
It is not intended by the foregoing observation to suggest that sum-
mary judgment motions in copyright infringement cases must be re-
stricted solely to "easy cases." Summary judgment motions are
properly used in copyright infringement cases only when they deal with
purely factual issues, no matter how complex these issues may be.
4. Access
The two major material issues of fact in a copyright infringement
79. Pepper & Tanner, Inc. v. Shamrock Broadcasting, Inc., 563 F.2d 391, 393, 395-96
(9th Cir. 1977).
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
81. Cf., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios. Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). In this
case the plaintiff, an author of a non-fiction account of the Hindenburg zeppelin tragedy
sued the author of a later fictional work on the subject, and the studio which produced the
second work as a photoplay. The author of the fictional work acknowledged referring to
plaintiff's work. Summary judgment for defendants was affirmed. The Second Circuit ap-
proves the practice of granting summary judgments to defendants "when all alleged similar-
ity related to non-copyrightable elements of the plaintiff's work" [court's emphasis]. Id. at
977. However, the Second Circuit is not unmindful of the risks implicit in this practice:
All of Hoehling's allegations of copying, therefore, encompass material that is
non-copyrightable as a matter of law, renderin summary judgment entirely ap-
propriate. We are aware, however, that in distinguishing between themes, facts,
and scenes afaire on the one hand, and copyrightable expression on the other,
courts may lose sight of the forest for the trees. By factoring out similarities based
on non-copyrightable elements, a court runs the risk of overlooking wholesale
usurpation of a prior author's expression. A verbatim reproduction of another
work, of course, even in the realm of nonfiction, is actionable as copyright infringe-
ment, [citing authority] Thus, in granting or reviewing a grant of summary judg,
ment for defendants, courts should assure themselves that the works before them
are not virtually identical. In this case, it is clear that all three authors relate the
story of the Hindenburg differently.
Id. at 979-80.
Naturally, where the factual side of a mixed question of law and fact concerning
copyrightability is resolved by stipulation or admission, then the caveat against resolving
issues of copyrightability in summary judgment motions is no longer applicable. The sole
issue remaining is the legal question of copyrightability/protectibility and this can properly
be resolved in a motion for summary judgment. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By
Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir. 1980).
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action are those of copying and improper appropriation.82 However,
the mere existence of numerous similarities between an earlier work
and a later one does not permit the automatic conclusion that the sec-
ond work copied the first.
One may infringe a patent by the innocent reproduction
of the machine patented, but the law imposes no prohibition
upon those who, without copying, independently arrive at the
precise combination of words or notes which have been copy-
righted.1
3
Accordingly, in every case concerning infringement by copying, the
courts look for some evidence of access, ie., for some indication that
the defendant had some direct or inferred contact or familiarity with,
knowledge or awareness of, the plaintiff's work. In short, whether the
defendant had any chance to copy the plaintiff's work.
8 4
There is direct evidence of access (i) where defendant, or those
acting for defendant, are found in possession of plaintiff's work, or of
portions thereof; or (ii) where there is clear evidence that plaintiff deliv-
ered his work to defendant (or his agents) before defendant (or his
agents) commenced or completed defendant's work; or (iii) where there
is clear evidence that defendant (or his agents) saw and/or examined
plaintiff's work before defendant (or his agents) commenced or com-
pleted defendant's work.85
Proof of physical access, i e., that the defendant had actual posses-
sion of plaintiff's work, is not necessary to establish infringement by
copying. Despite sworn testimony by defendant that he got his mate-
rial from sources other than plaintiff's work, access may be inferred or
found circumstantially, from the fact that plaintiff's work was written
and disseminated prior to the time that defendant's work appeared, or
from the fact that striking similarities (inclusive of the repetition of
common errors) revealed upon the comparison of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's works cannot rationally be explained away as mere coinci-
dence or accident.
8 6
Clearly, the determination of the factual issue of access, whether
82. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-469 (2d Cir. 1946), andsee text accompanying
notes 63-66, supra.
83. Judge Learned Hand in Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
84. Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 947-49, afd, 304 F.2d
251 (9th Cir. 1962); Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborne, Inc., 146 F. Supp.
795, 797-98 (S.D. Cal. 1956); A.S. Katz, CopyrightiProtection f,4rchitecturalPlans Drawings
and Designs, 19 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB., 224, 243 (1954).
85. Id.
86. Dorchester Music Corporation v. National Broadcasting Company, 171 F. Supp.
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direct or inferred, is a proper subject of a motion for summary judg-
ment. If the opportunity to copy is established, then the trial court, in a
motion for summary judgment, may properly examine the similarities,
or note their absence, in making a determination of the factual issue of
copying.87
Should the trial court find that copying exists he then turns to the
factual issue of improper appropriation. The court must determine
whether there was a substantial or material copying of protectible ma-
terial from plaintiff's work. Assuming there is no issue as to protec-
tibility, ie., copyrightability, facing the court concerning the material
allegedly copied, he is free to inquire into the issue of substantial copy-
ing during a motion for summary judgment.8 "
An early American literary property scholar has noted:
The true test of piracy. . . is not whether a composition
is copied in the same language or the exact words of the origi-
nal, but whether in substance it is reproduced; not whether
the whole, but whether a material part, is taken.8 9
5. Material or Substantial Copying
What, then, is a material or substantial copying? This is more a
question of quality than quantity. The test appears to be: if that por-
tion of a work is taken upon which its commercial or artistic success
depends, the taking will be deemed substantial, regardless of the small
volume which the misappropriated portion bears to the total mass of
the work.90
The issue of originality is a crucial one in copyright infringement
cases, since originality is the sole test of the validity of a copyright. 9' In
580, 586-87 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Doran v. Sunset House Distributing Corp.. 197 F. Supp. 940,
947-48, affd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962); Katz, note 84 supra at 243-44.
87. See, e.g., C.S. Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe, 146 F. Supp. 514,
515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (summary judgment for plaintiff); Decorative Aides Corp. v. Staple
Sewing Aides, 497 F. Supp. 154, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (summary judgment for defendant).
88. See the discussion at text accompanying note 81 supra.
89. DRONE ON COPYRIGHT 385 (1879).
90. Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn Inc., 146 F. Supp. 795, 797-98 (S.D.
Cal. 1956); Dorchester Music Corporation v. National Broadcasting Company, 171 F. Supp.
580, 586-87 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Service, Inc., 476 F.2d
386 (8th Cir. 1973); Herman Frankel Organization v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D.
Mich. 1973); Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 197 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1964); Smith
v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P.2d 546 (1959); Henry Holt & Co., Inc. v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302,303 (E.D. Pa. 1938); Boosey v. Empire Music Co., Inc.,
224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
91. Fisher v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). In Fisher. Judge Learned Hand
remarked:
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a full trial on the merits it should be the first issue to be approached.
However, since the determination of the issue of originality raises a
mixed question of law and fact, it cannot properly be considered in a
motion for summary judgment for copyright infringement.
92
V. CONCLUSION CONCERNING COPYRIGHT CASES
In concluding this portion of the article, it is submitted that the
proper use of the motion for summary judgment in intellectual prop-
erty cases in general, and in copyright cases in particular, will be en-
hanced, and its erroneous use diminished, if each trial court, before
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, would review the evidence
before him and ask, "could I, at the end of the trial, with this evidence
admitted, take the case from the jury and properly direct a verdict?" If
the answer is "yes", the court should grant the motion for summary
judgment. If the answer is "no", the motion should be denied."
[Part Two, concerning the use of summary judgment practice in patent,
trademark and unfair competition cases, will appear in a forthcoming
issue of this Journal.]
[The work in question] ... must be deemed to be original, if by original one
means that it was the spontaneous, unsuggested result of the author's imagina-
tion .... this ... squarely raises the question whether it be a defense to a copy-
right that the precise work has independently appeared before it and is in the
public domain.
Section 7 [now Section 8]. . . provides that 'no copyright shall subsist in the
original text of any work which is in the public domain. This is not new law, and
means no more than that by taking such a text you may not get a copyright upon
it.. . . It has no application whatever to a work which is of original composition,
because such a work is not the 'original' text of any work in the public domain, but
a second and equally 'original' text of a work never published before its copyright.
Id. at 149. And see discussion at text accompanying notes 69-72, supra.
92. Pepper & Tanner, Inc. v. Shamrock Broadcasting, Inc., 563 F.2d 391, 393, 395-96
(9th Cir. 1977).
93. This question is based upon an acute observation by Judge Frank in Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1946).
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APPENDIX A
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 56: Summary Judgment
(a) FOR CLAIMANT. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may,
at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of
the action of after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) FOR DEFENDING PARTY. A party against whom a claim, coun-
terclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought
may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The ad-
verse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, dep-
ositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) CASE NOT FULLY ADJUDICATED ON MOTION. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all
the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the
motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts
eXist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actu-
ally and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, includ-
ing the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) FORM OF AFFIDAVITS; FURTHER TESTIMONY; DEFENSE RE-
QUIRED. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evi-
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dence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to tes-
tify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or
served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affida-
vits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, sum-
mary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) WHEN AFFIDAVITS ARE UNAVAILABLE. Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continu-
ance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) AFFIDAVITS MADE IN BAD FAITH. Should it appear to the sat-
isfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose
of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to
pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the
filing of affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's
fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjusted guilty of
contempt.
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APPENDIX B
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 437c. Summary judgment; claim of no
merit to action or no defense; affidavits; partial establishment
of claim; appealable judgment
Any party may move for summary judgment in any action or pro-
ceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no
defense thereto. The motion may be made at any time after 60 days
have elapsed since the general appearance in the action or proceeding
of each party against whom the motion is directed or at such earlier
time after such general appearance as the court, with or without notice
and upon good cause shown, may direct. Notice of the motion and
supporting papers shall be served on the other party to the action at
least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The motion shall be
heard no later than 45 days before the date of trial, unless the court for
good cause orders otherwise. The filing of such motion shall not extend
the time within which a party must otherwise file a responsive pleading.
The motion shall be supported or opposed by affidavits, declara-
tions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions and matters of
which judicial notice shall or may be taken. Evidentiary objections,
not raised here or orally at the hearing, shall be deemed waived.
Such motion shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining
whether the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers,
except that to which objections have been made and sustained by the
court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from such evidence, ex-
cept summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on
inferences reasonably deducible from such evidence, if contradicted by
other inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to any mate-
rial fact.
Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations shall be made
by any person on personal knowledge, shall set forth admissible evi-
dence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to tes-
tify to the matters stated therein.
If a party is otherwise entitled to a summary judgment pursuant to
the provisions of this section, summary judgment shall not be denied
on grounds of credibility or for want of cross-examination of witnesses
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furnishing affidavits or declarations in support of the summary judg-
ment, except that summary judgment may be denied in the discretion
of the court, where the only proof of a material fact offered in support
of the summary judgment is an affidavit or declaration made by an
individual who was the sole witness to such fact; or where a material
fact is an individual's state of mind, or lack thereof, and such fact is
sought to be established solely by the individual's affirmation thereof.
If it appears that the proof supports the granting of such motion as
to some but not all the issues involved in the action, or that one or more
of the issues raised by a claim is admitted, or that one or more of the
issues raised by a defense is conceded, the court shall, by order, specify
that such issues are without substantial controversy. At the trial of the
action the issue so specified shall be deemed established and the action
shall proceed as to the issues remaining.
If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to the mo-
tion that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for
reasons stated, then be presented, the court shall deny the motion, or
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to
be had or may make such other order as may be just.
If the court determines at any time that any of the affidavits are
presented in bad faith or solely for purposes of delay, the court shall
order the party presenting such affidavits to pay the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits
caused such other party to incur.
Except where a separate judgment may properly be awarded in the
action, no final judgment shall be entered on a motion for summary
judgment prior to the termination of such action, but the final judg-
ment in such action shall, in addition to any matters determined in
such action, award judgment as established by the summary proceed-
ing herein provided for.
A summary judgment entered under this section is an appealable
judgment as in other cases.

